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FISSURING AND THE FIRM EXEMPTION
SANJUKTA PAUL*
I
INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST’S MONOPOLY ON LICENSING ECONOMIC
COORDINATION
Workers beyond the bounds of employment and other small players are
deprived of coordination rights under fissuring1 in addition to being subject to
the control of relatively large, powerful firms. But this absence of coordination
rights is neither an inexorable force of nature as the economy changes, nor is it a
free-standing legal fact. Rather, the conditions under which workers and small
enterprises are deprived of coordination rights in these business arrangements
are instead part of an overall allocation of coordination rights—an affirmative
policy choice on the part of antitrust law—that grants coordination rights to some
actors while denying them to others. Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, antitrust law’s
basic function is to license some forms of economic coordination and bar others.2
Private parties may not decide by contract whether they will or will not
coordinate: they must have public approval to do so. Furthermore, where and
how antitrust law has historically drawn, and today does draw, the line between
exempt and non-exempt economic arrangements is not in reality outsourced to
any external referent: not property law, not corporate law, and not economics. In
the 1970’s, Robert Bork and others invoked the notion of “efficiency” internal to
mainstream economics—thereby borrowing for a particular allocation of
coordination rights its prestige—in order to bless unrelated and erroneous ideas
about “productive efficiencies,” i.e., the virtues of authoritarian hierarchy, which
are embodied in the traditional firm and extended under firm fissuring. In truth,
coordination rights are allocated on the basis of self-referential criteria internal
to antitrust law.3
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1. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014) (I use the term “fissuring” to refer to fissured business
structures generally speaking, not only the workplace as such.). See also Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring
Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO L. J. 969
(2016).
2. Sanjukta M. Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2020).
3. Id.
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This paper now applies that framework to first explain how “lead firms”—as
David Weil calls them—in fissured business arrangements take advantage of the
expansion of antitrust permission to engage in economic coordination in the form
of control beyond the firm, as well as the contraction of antitrust permission to
engage in coordination in the form of cooperation beyond the firm. In the first
sense, lead firms—franchisors, firms that make use of individual or small
independent contractors, and now many tech platforms—are able to control
smaller actors in their orbits without the censure of antitrust law. In the second
sense, these firms are protected from any countervailing power that these smaller
actors might bring to bear upon their relationships with them. This paper then
goes on to show how that lead firms’ coordination exceeds or stretches regions of
both the deep grammar (in the sense of deeply held assumptions that aren’t
necessarily expressly articulated) and the surface grammar (in the sense of
expressly articulated doctrine) of antitrust law. Moreover, the bar on smaller
actors’ coordination itself internalizes what I call “the firm exemption,” as I show
through a close look at the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, which is perhaps the strongest articulation of that rule.
The price coordination that takes place within a firm is typically—if one digs
far enough—putatively justified by the property rights of investors, even though
it is not logically derivable from them. Imagine a firm that sells a service: playing
the organ for special events, for example. Organists who band together to engage
in price coordination or market allocation are denied such coordination rights by
antitrust, as indeed a recent prosecution by the FTC confirmed.4 On the other
hand, if investors jointly create a corporation that then hires the same organists,
their price-setting (or internal market allocation) activity is deemed untouchable
by antitrust. Notably, this is currently also true even if the firm only contracts with
the organists, even though that arrangement undercuts all the available reasons
for the firm exemption in the first place.
Many fissured business arrangements take this disjunction further. Imagine if
the same corporation presents itself as a tech platform selling the use of an app
to both organists and their customers. In the current regulatory environment, it
will be able to engage in price coordination beyond firm boundaries: setting the
price of a product it does not even purport to sell, namely organist services. At
the same time, the organists themselves are barred from joint price-setting or
joint bargaining; they are effectively forced to pay the corporation for use of the
license to engage in price coordination that it receives free of charge from the
state.
Ride-hailing tech firms like Uber and Lyft, fast-food franchisors, as well as
firms that rely primarily upon services provided by independent contractors, all
engage in price coordination beyond firm boundaries. Meanwhile, the law
prohibits the workers and small enterprises in the orbits of such firms from

4. See Am. Guild of Organists, F.T.C. 151 0159 (2017).
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engaging in economic coordination, either directly,5 or by selectively and
inconsistently ascribing firm status as between antitrust and other areas of law,
notably labor law. In each of these respects, antitrust’s affirmative edicts, its
omissions, and its latent and softer influences upon policy all combine to extend
its underlying express preference for allocating coordination rights to existing
concentrations of economic power—even as the internal justifications for that
preference comes increasingly undone.
II
THE EXPANSION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS IN FISSURED ARRANGEMENTS
Antitrust’s fundamental function is to allocate economic coordination rights,
demarcating spaces of competition and coordination in economic life.6 Moreover,
the firm exemption creates the paradigm space for coordination chosen by
today’s antitrust law.7 Applying this framework to the phenomenon of fissuring,
and its legal treatment, we see more clearly both the tensions in the firm
exemption and how this exemption has interacted with intentional business
decisions aimed at expanding it. The dynamic that has driven this expansion of
coordination rights involves four components: (1) developments in antitrust
doctrine, notably in the area of vertical restraints but also the single entity
doctrine, that have liberalized coordination rights centered in large, powerful
firms; (2) the tacit expansion of the deeper-rooted legal concept of the firm and
its boundaries within antitrust, i.e., the firm exemption; (3) intentional business
practices, such as the replacement of employees with independent contractors,
franchising, and “platform” arrangements like Uber’s, that have sought to
legitimize themselves in the eyes of institutional actors and the public, in turn
reinforcing both (1) and (2); and (4) arguments associated with law and
economics scholarship about what sorts of business arrangements—and limits
upon competition—are “efficiency-enhancing.”
Policy debates sometimes proceed as if antitrust law is, or should be, simply
an implementation of (4). But in fact, antitrust law tacitly relies upon legal
categories at the level of either surface or deep grammar, even when it purports
to simply implement economic theory.8 We see this in the context of fissuring in
terms of the reliance upon legal categories furnished by the law of vertical
restraints and at a deeper level by the firm exemption. Moreover, it is not even
logically possible for antitrust to simply implement the prescriptions of economic
theory, given that some prior normative limitations upon competition are both
necessary and not themselves derivable from neutral principles. Instead, the
administration of competition policy entails initial political and moral choices.
5. Under its current interpretation by the courts, Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars much interfirm horizontal coordination, including price coordination. See 15 USC §1 (1890); FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
6. Paul, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Paul, supra note 2.
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The doctrinal mechanisms of the expanded permission to exert control
beyond the firm—what I am calling the legal surface grammar—are the law of
vertical restraints and to some extent the single entity doctrine, both of which
have been made significantly more permissive since the late 1970’s. Meanwhile,
the coordination rights granted to small players have been narrowed through an
increasingly rigid norm against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries.9
Yet despite these superficially favorable developments from the perspective
of firms experimenting with new business arrangements, a deeper disconnect
plagues their antitrust treatment. In today’s fissured business arrangements, even
the relatively thin putative justifications for this asymmetric allocation of
coordination rights, centered in antitrust’s firm exemption, have come unmoored
from actual conditions. The firm exemption and its expansion in the Borkian
revolution are grounded ultimately in arguments about the productive
efficiencies that flow from managerial hierarchies and enterprise integration.10
But these arguments about economies of scale, and about the efficiencies of
managerial hierarchies, are centered largely upon the manufacturing context,
whereas many of today’s fissured business arrangements involve retail or
services.11 Even more, as the rest of this Part shows, insofar as fissured business
arrangements are precisely defined by reorganizing intra-firm relations as interfirm ones, they continue to claim the benefits of antitrust’s firm exemption even
as—according to their own self-representations—the conditions of its
applicability (assuming, arguendo, their validity) no longer apply.
A. Franchising
Franchising typifies the dynamic that has driven the expansion of large firms’
coordination rights under conditions of business fissuring: an iterative interaction
between shifting legal norms and affirmative decisions about structuring business
arrangements. Franchisors succeeded in normalizing their business model in the
eyes of the public, institutional actors, and the decisional law, relying to a large
extent upon arguments that the business arrangement is efficiency-enhancing,
ultimately benefiting consumers.12 However, aspects of the standard franchising

9. Infra, part III. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding minimum fee
schedules for lawyers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States., 435
U.S. 679 (1978) (finding Society’s prevention of competitive bidding by members was per se illegal); FTC
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (ruling against an agreement among
independent trial lawyers to withhold services until compensation for appointments was increased).
10. Paul, supra note 2.
11. The literature on operational efficiencies to be realized through concentration and managerial
hierarchies was largely based on the manufacturing context. See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER ET AL.,
THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY (1975);
David B. Audretsch, Corporate Form and Spatial Form, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
GEOGRAPHY 333 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2000); F.M. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE. L.J. 974 (1977).
12. See Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of
Franchising, 2, 11 (U. Mass. Amherst, Dept. Econ., Working Paper, Sep. 5, 2018) (finding economists
and economic historians have largely emphasized franchising as firms’ response to “exogenous
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business model still outstrip the now-permissive vertical restraints cases, and
reveal tensions in the reigning consumer welfare standard.
Overall, by confining antitrust-immunized control relations largely to the
space within the firm—and to a few more democratic arrangements outside the
firm—mid-century antitrust had historically placed some limits on the
unreciprocal control exerted by franchisors over franchisees. Mid-century
antitrust took a dim view of control imposed through vertical, contractual
restraints, for example by franchisors upon franchisees. Importantly, this view
was motivated more by a norm of non-domination than by an idea of realizing
ideal competitive prices, or of attaining the lowest possible consumer prices.13
The Borkian turn in antitrust law that took hold in the 1970s worked to remove
these limits on vertical restraints.14 By doing so, it demonstrated that its
fundamental preference for allocating coordination rights is not only within firms,
but also by large, powerful firms (at least so long as that coordination too is in
the form of control over less-powerful actors). Around the same period, the
Borkian turn expanded antitrust law’s concept of the firm itself, to capture
parent-subsidiary relationships and other corporate groups, and thus extended
antitrust immunity to any coordination between separate corporations within
these relationships.15 The single entity doctrine, as it is called, expressly inscribes
the preference for economic coordination in the form of control, preferably
grounded in concentrated ownership interests.16 Franchisors have used and relied
upon both of these changes in antitrust law to justify their control over
franchisees and at times, franchisees’ employees.
Fast-food franchisors coordinate their franchising families various ways. They
exert control over key elements of franchisees’ supply, labor, and product
decisions. Notably, they even exert control over the prices of the products sold
technological changes” by “adopt[ing] more efficient organizational techniques”) and 11. See also, e.g.,
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 108 (1978) (arguing that vertical restraints imposed by
contract are efficient and benefit consumers).
13. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (finding vertically imposed
maximum prices by oil company on gas station re-sellers was illegal, where the Court’s reasoning is based
as much upon the freedom of the small dealers, as it is on promoting the competitive price); United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that geographical and other restrictions upon
franchisees’ sale of goods, once franchisees had taken title, violated Section 1). See also United States. v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (holding vertical restrictions on gas station operators
by the oil company were impermissible, and reasoning that gas station operators were tenants, not
employees, and thus principles of subordination inherent in hierarchical vertical coordination were
inappropriate). See also Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy and Labor Market Power, 82
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3, at 45 2019.
14. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (expanding the permission of
geographical market allocation restraints placed by franchisors upon franchisees); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997) (legalizing maximum price restraints by powerful firms upon small re-sellers); Leegin
Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (permitting minimum price restraints upon
re-sellers).
15. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding parent company and
subsidiary incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act). See also Paul,
supra note 2.
16. Id.; Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010).

65 - BOOK PROOF - PAUL - FISSURING & THE FIRM EXEMPTION (DO NOT DELETE)

70

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/14/2019 10:07 AM

[Vol. 82:65

by franchisee firms, typically in the direction of driving them down. One
McDonald’s franchisee noted that “participation in deals and pricing is voluntary
only in theory,” and that on an occasion when its coffee price was a nickel over
the franchisor-advertised sale price, “the head of the McDonald’s region came in
and he said: ‘You are over. You can’t do this.’”17 Some other franchisors even
more straightforwardly set the prices charged by franchisee firms; for example,
janitorial franchisors often directly bargain contracts with customers on
franchisees’ behalf.18 Burger King, like McDonald’s, exerts the same downward
pressure on its franchisees’ prices through its “Value Menu.”19
Franchisors have also placed limits upon worker mobility within franchise
“families” through so-called no-poaching provisions placed into franchisee
contracts. In the past, franchisors have successfully claimed immunity for these
controls under Copperweld, or the single entity doctrine, thereby claiming that
franchisees are effectively extensions of the franchisor itself.20 Such provisions
have recently come in for new criticism, and have been challenged by workers in
a number of pending cases.21 In the current disputes, some franchisors have again
raised the single entity defense, but thus far a judge has not ratified it. To
expressly ratify this theory would be to make explicit the selective application of
firm status to franchise “families” as between antitrust and labor law. Franchisees
themselves are denied coordination rights by antitrust law,22 further cementing
franchisors’ power. Meanwhile, franchisees’ employees’ fight for coordination
rights, for example in the form of unionization, has also been frustrated by
franchisors’ position that they are completely separate from franchisees, which
would require workers to separately unionize numerous small franchisees. In
short, franchisors have thus far been permitted to disclaim affiliation with
17. Jana Kasperkevic, McDonald’s franchise owners: what they really think about the fight for $15,
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2015.
18. WEIL, supra note 1.
19. Burger King Corp. v. E-Z Eating 8th Corp., No. 07-20181, 2008 WL 11330723 (S.D. Fla., May
22, 2008) (documenting an order on motion for summary judgment in lawsuit by franchisor Burger King
Corporation against franchisees for breach of contract, on the ground that they shut down prior to the
contract’s expiration. Franchisees counter-claimed that they were operating under “extreme losses” due
to franchisor’s imposition of the “Value Menu”). See also Burger King Corp. v. E-Z Eating, 572 F.3d
1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding summary judgment for Burger King Corporation on the ground that its
imposition of the Value Menu on franchisors did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).
20. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing former employee’s
claim that “no-switching” provision in franchising agreement violated Sherman Act, on the basis that
franchisor and franchisee cannot conspire under Copperweld).
21. A number of plaintiffs have recently challenged coordination within franchise families that limits
the hiring of former employees. See, e.g., DesLandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018
WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018); Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC., No. 4:17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex., dismissed
July 16, 2018); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018). Meanwhile,
franchisors continue to disclaim single entity status for purpose of labor regulation, whether of wages or
collective bargaining. See, e.g., Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 14-CV-02096-RS, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS
10876 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (arising under the California Labor Code); McDonald’s USA, LLC, 363
N.L.R.B. 144 (2016) (dealing with a complaint arising under the National Labor Relations Act).
22. The legal basis for denying franchisees coordination rights is discussed in Part III, infra.
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franchisee firms altogether under labor law, even as they frequently claim that
franchisees are extensions of the firm under antitrust, in both cases cementing
their exclusive coordination rights in the overall arrangement.
The pending no-poach cases also illustrate the operation of the law of vertical
restraints and franchisors’ attempts to stretch its limits. To see this, note first that
even franchisors’ control over franchisee product pricing decisions ought to be
uncertain territory. As noted, franchisors exert control over consumer prices
charged by franchisees, in addition to aspects of their dealings with suppliers and
workers. Even under the existing law’s profound preference for vertical control
over horizontal coordination, franchisors’ control over franchisee pricing—which
in turn has direct, negative implications for franchisees’ labor relationships and
workers’ wages23—does not obviously fit within the parameters of legal vertical
restraints. The paradigm cases, from GTE Sylvania (geographic market
allocation) to Khan (maximum prices) to Leegin (minimum prices), all deal with
re-sale of a product sold by the actor seeking to impose the restraint. Franchisors
do not sell hamburgers to franchisees, who then re-sell them. This problem is not
necessarily resolved by extending the principles of these cases to intangible
property—such as the franchise brand—which are covered.24
There is, in any event, no credible argument for extending these precedents
to labor-facing restraints imposed by franchisors upon franchisees. Franchisors
do not hire out workers to franchisees. No proprietary technology licensed by
franchisors to franchisees is implicated in those relationships. Yet the
Department of Justice chose to file a brief in these pending cases effectively
supporting franchisors’ position and suggesting that no-poach agreements
limiting mobility among some of the lowest-wage, most vulnerable workers have
legally cognizable benefits.25 This is notable in part because it dramatizes the
tensions in antitrust law’s current governing normative framework. The DOJ
brief purports to treat labor market restraints symmetrically with product market
restraints. But this is belied by their own arguments about the putative
countervailing efficiencies of no-poach agreements, which are framed purely in
terms of consumer benefits, namely lower prices. This points up a basic tension
within the existing legal framework, which simultaneously claims to treat worker
welfare equally with consumer welfare, but which only admits evidence of
countervailing benefits to consumers, primarily price benefits, when evaluating
forms of permitted coordination. In short, the DOJ’s briefs supporting

23. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, McDonald’s franchisee says the company told her “just pay your
employees less,” WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2014.
24. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property do
extend the principles of resale price maintenance to intangible technologies, but even if hamburgers could
be said to qualify as incorporating a “licensed technology,” these guidelines refer to price maintenance
and not maximum prices required by franchisors. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.2 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/4T6Y-YBVM].
25. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Harris v. CJ Star, LLC, No.
2:18-cv-00247 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), ECF No. 38.
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franchisors’ position in the pending cases brought by fast food workers to
invalidate employee no-poach agreements imposed by franchisors upon
franchisees stretch existing tendencies in the law to favor control by powerful
firms, which is presumed to confer consumer benefits.
In effect, the DOJ’s brief seeks to enshrine in the official, surface grammar of
the law what has heretofore been only a tacit expansion at the level of its deeper
grammar, where the firm exemption partially resides. That tacit expansion of the
borders of the firm exemption has been achieved through decades of creating
facts on the ground by naturalizing franchisors’ business model, and through
economic arguments that these arrangements are efficiency-enhancing because
of lower consumer prices.
B. Ride-Hailing Firms
In his account of the political economy of franchising in its critical decades of
regulatory change, Brian Callaci has noted that franchisors’ endeavor to
“persuade regulators, legislators, and courts that their business form was sui
generis and should not be regulated according to existing conceptions” will “be
familiar to observers of twenty-first century gig economy firms.”26 The ridehailing apps represent the forward prow of “platform” arrangements that are, by
all accounts, popping up throughout the service sector. These firms set the price
of rides. They also contend that that those rides are sold by independent
businesses—drivers—not by the firms. Therefore, these firms facilitate
horizontal price coordination among sellers beyond firm boundaries, leading at
least one district court judge to recognize a cognizable claim for a per se violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.27 Overall, the Uber problem is a more brazen
version of the franchising problem, and it creates a more obvious conflict under
existing antitrust law. Still, it is basically continuous with franchising—a fact that
could either lead us to revisit the asymmetric allocation of coordination rights in
franchising, or to bless the even more starkly asymmetric allocation of
coordination rights in the ride-hailing sector. The current antitrust authorities
have signaled their preference for the latter. Meanwhile, the antitrust
implications of platform labor/services arrangements remain far less fully
explored than, for example, their labor and employment law implications.28
26. Brian Callaci, Vertical Dis-Integration and the Creation of a New Business Form: Franchising
1960-1980, 10 (Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper Series, 2018).
27. See, e.g., Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15-9796, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Uber’s
subsequent successful motion to compel arbitration in this dispute with riders prevents us from seeing
this legal contest unfold.
28. A few exceptions include Marshall Steinbaum, supra note 13, Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the
Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016); Sanjukta Paul, Uber
as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its Implication, BJELL 2017; Mark Anderson &
Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in
Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859 (2017). Huffman and Anderson acknowledge that Uber has
an antitrust problem. Without taking a definitive position on whether Uber would be subject to the per
se rule or the rule of reason under current law, they argue that its business model ought to be permitted
as a policy matter, and propose changes to antitrust to accommodate it: namely a liberalization of the
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What public debate there has been on the antitrust implications of the ridehailing firms’ pricing practices has focused to a large extent on algorithmic
pricing.29 Algorithmic pricing is certainly an interesting and important topic in
itself, but the immediate antitrust questions relating to Uber and similar firms do
not stem from the fact that they set prices for ride services through an algorithm.
Rather, they stem from the fact that Uber sets prices for ride services in the first
place. Similarly, there are a slew of articles on the “efficiencies” brought about
by Uber. Deeper normative questions aside for the moment, these are not in
themselves legal justifications for Uber’s coordination; they must fit within
existing legal categories that, in effect, condition the justificatory power of such
putative benefits. This conditioning role for legal categories is non-optional:
arguments about efficiency are not free-standing but ultimately themselves
presuppose legal categories—notably, the firm exemption—for organizing
coordination.
These firms have even more obvious problems than franchising in the surface
structure of existing antitrust law. A ride-hailing tech platform cannot
straightforwardly argue that its relationship to its drivers constitutes a single
entity for antitrust purposes, as this is inconsistent with its claim that drivers are
its consumers, and is also inconsistent with its defense in employment cases
alleging that drivers are really employees. In the employee misclassification
cases, these firms argue they lack control over drivers and engage in little or no
top-down coordination.30 Since ownership is already dispersed in terms of the
primary relevant physical capital (vehicles), top-down coordination simply is the
only other factor the firms have available to argue under Copperweld. Uber’s
ability to immunize its coordination under the Copperweld line of cases is
doubtful; its ability to do so and to maintain its defense in the employee
misclassification cases is virtually impossible.
Moreover, Uber and similar firms are unlikely to succeed in showing that
their price coordination constitutes a permissible vertical restraint if current law
is interpreted fairly. The paradigm cases that liberalized the law of vertical
restraints never immunized price restraints as far removed from the transaction
that Uber claims to have with its drivers. Uber and similar firms say that they
license the use of software to drivers, which facilitates drivers’ transactions with
riders. But the price restraints Uber places on drivers relate to the rides
themselves. As Judge Rakoff pointed out in rejecting Uber’s argument of

Copperweld defense that would allow for the consideration of degrees of integration and risk-sharing,
rather than a binary decision on single entity status. To the extent that they argue that rule of reason
treatment is not foreclosed for Uber, however, Anderson and Huffman’s position also generally supports
drivers’ own coordination, although they do not directly address it. Other commentators, many of them
economists, also argue that Uber confers consumer benefits without making it clear what the legal
relevance of those benefits is, given the nature of Uber’s business model. See, e.g., Judd Cramer & Alan
Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (2016).
29. See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms,
100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
30. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Tech.’s., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

65 - BOOK PROOF - PAUL - FISSURING & THE FIRM EXEMPTION (DO NOT DELETE)

74

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/14/2019 10:07 AM

[Vol. 82:65

verticality and denying its motion to dismiss the Section 1 lawsuit brought against
it by consumers, drivers are not re-selling ride services sold to them by Uber,
which is the classic re-sale justifying vertical restraints under existing case-law.31
GTE Sylvania involved the re-sale of TV’s, where the TV market was the subject
of the restraint at issue. State Oil Co. v. Khan involved the re-sale of gas and oil,
where the prices of those commodities were the subject of the restraint at issue.
Leegin involved the re-sale of clothing, whose prices were the subject of the
restraint at issue. None involved price restraints on commodities (here, ride
services) that were themselves unrelated to the commodity (here, use of the app)
sold by the restraining firm (Uber) to the purchaser-firm (drivers). It is true that
both maximum and minimum price restraints can now relate to an intangible
product, like the app, but that does not change the structure of the transactions
and relationships at issue: drivers are not re-selling the use of the app to riders.32
Nor can it be plausibly argued that what they are selling to riders is a “product
incorporating the licensed technology.”33 And indeed, the few law review articles
that do consider the Section 1 implications of Uber’s pricing practices in any
detail do not take seriously the possibility that Uber’s price coordination
constitutes a permissible vertical restraint, although they may advocate other
legal reforms that would permit it.34
The problem here is that the many efficiencies claimed for Uber are not
legally salient unless Uber shows that its pricing practices fall within the existing
law of vertical restraints. Putting that problem aside for the moment, the
efficiencies claimed for Uber fall roughly into two categories: (1) the app works
well, reducing transaction costs of driver-rider bargains; or, less frequently
articulated, (2) Uber avoids the responsibilities of employment and the business
risks of vehicle ownership, thereby reducing costs.35 The second of these
contentions is transparently question-begging.
As to (1), let’s indeed assume that the app works very well in achieving the
functional goal of matching drivers and riders in time and space, which is the
essence of the claim. The problem is that this is neither here nor there with
respect to the legal question. The issue is not whether the app is a great invention.
There have been a great many great inventions; and while there may at times be
something specific about a particular invention that forms the basis for a
particular legal right, the greatness of an invention does not itself create a generic
entitlement to selectively preferential legal treatment. The claim would have to

31. See Ord. on Motion to Dismiss, Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817.
32. Note that this argument does not necessarily imply acceptance of the “hub and spoke theory”
endorsed by Judge Rakoff in his order denying Uber’s motion to dismiss. The hub and spoke theory is
an exception to the applicability of the rule of reason for vertical restraints, but a) implies that the vertical
arrangement comes within the existing principles justifying the rule of reason in the first place, and b)
requires agreement among the “spokes” (here, drivers), which is unlikely to be met.
33. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 24.
34. Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm,
a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859 (2017).
35. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 34.
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be that the price coordination activity itself generates operational efficiencies.
But there is no argument for that. The app could match riders in space and time
without setting prices, and that would exhaust all the efficiencies have been
claimed for it.36
The price coordination activity performed by the apps might be valuable for
a completely different reason, namely that it performs a market stabilization
function. Market stabilization largely isn’t recognized as a good in the current
antitrust framework, at least not officially. And of course, a drivers’ union would
perform market stabilization functions as well, as indeed unions, trade
associations, and other organizations can do more generally.37 But again, this
can’t be the reason to permit Uber’s price coordination without also justifying
Uber drivers’ collective bargaining, or for that matter, without also justifying a
cartel of drivers who own their own vehicles and simply share an app that
performs a price coordination function. This is a basic and deep tension in the
law and in antitrust thinking, because on some level antitrust actors do seem to
acknowledge the need for market stabilization when thinking about some specific
cases, but the official principles do not. This leads then to the selective application
of antitrust rules in favor of large, powerful actors’ coordination and against small
players’. It creeps in even to Anderson and Huffman’s argument, as they
acknowledge that price coordination is not relevant to the official efficiency
defenses, but that drivers are unlikely to participate without it.38
Related to the market stabilization issue, Anderson and Huffman at times
describe the resultant efficiencies in terms of Uber’s enhanced business revenue,
which in turn passes benefits on to consumers.39 Not only is there no good
principle, however, to define enhanced business revenue as a social benefit to be
weighed in favor of coordination, while refusing to consider the benefits of
reasonable wages in the same manner, but also the firms foreclose the use of that
argument by also defining drivers as themselves businesses. By this logic,
anything that drivers do to enhance their business revenue is also an efficiency to
be weighed against any losses from coordination.
Finally, Uber has a better chance of avoiding per se treatment under the
principles articulated in a minor strain of Section 1 case law that is more tolerant
to horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries—but it has a better chance
precisely to the extent that drivers’ own coordination would also not be subject
to the per se rule under them. For example, Appalachian Coals would directly
militate in favor of permitting drivers’ coordination because it straightforwardly
acknowledges market stabilization in the face of destructive competition as a
legitimate criterion for antitrust decision-making.40

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

To their credit, Anderson and Huffman acknowledge this point.
See, e.g., FREDERIC S. LEE, MICROECONOMICS: A HETERODOX APPROACH (2017).
Anderson & Huffman, supra note 34.
Id.
See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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However, if the DOJ’s position in the pending franchising no-poach cases
succeeds in expanding the law of vertical restraints to become even more
permissive, this would have favorable implications for Uber’s ability to argue that
the price restraints it places on drivers are in fact permissible vertical restraints.
It would also even further crystallize the preference for economic coordination
imposed by a large, powerful actor—even when functionally indistinguishable
from voluntary coordination by many smaller actors—on the part of the current
antitrust paradigm.
C. Independent Contractor Firms
Finally, these anomalies in antitrust treatment of various forms of
coordination extend to an older form of business fissuring: namely firms that rely
principally upon independent contractors, and which then sell a commodity that
in substantial part comprises those services. These firms’ right to engage in price
coordination has not been seriously questioned under antitrust, though their
structure departs from the conventional justification for the firm exemption.
Antitrust’s firm exemption relies ultimately upon an internal organization
based on command rather than contract.41 This command is derived from the
relationship of agency—in other words, employment. And indeed, under the
positive law, the very thing that defined an independent contractor is that she’s
not an agent of the firm.42 But without her agency, what “firm-ness” is left? Even
after recasting almost all of its prior employment relationships as commercial
contracts, such a firm retains the privileges of the firm exemption.
To take an example, many trucking firms in the United States today fit the
template I just gave: they buy truck-driving services from individuals whom they
characterize as independent contractors, and they sell trucking services to their
customers. They typically have a few administrative employees, but their core
product is not only made by independent contractors, it is the very service
performed by those individuals. Other than obtaining contracts with customers
and bargaining those contracts, such a firm usually does not do much else. It has
no other production facilities, and according to its own self-characterization, it
does not extensively monitor drivers’ provision of services.
Now consider the antitrust treatment of such a firm. The trucking firm gets to
set the prices it charges its customers for trucking services. That seems natural
enough. But is it? Functionally, this is a form of price coordination: the firm is
setting the prices for the services performed by all, say, twenty drivers. Imagine
that in this particular market for trucking services, there are four other firms of
twenty drivers each. Now suppose that instead of working for the first firm, these
same twenty drivers begin working directly for customers, but form a bargaining
unit for the purpose of negotiating their contracts with customers. They agree
internally upon rates and they do not deviate from rates set by their designated

41. See Paul, supra note 2.
42. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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bargaining agent. Without changing much, if anything at all, about the tangible
economic activity that is taking place, we have moved from a situation in which
the right to coordinate prices is uncontested for antitrust purposes, to one that
courts and federal competition authorities would undoubtedly label a “garden
variety price-fixing ring.”43 Note that between these examples, there is no
difference in effects on third parties, whether they are customers, suppliers or
rival firms or associations. Indeed, Bork himself acknowledged that there is no
such difference in market effects between firms and cartels, until one brings in
the putative efficiencies and thus consumer benefits of the firm’s internal agency
relationships.44 Having removed those agency relationships from the
organization of the production or service in question by transforming them into
contracts, however, the justification for favorable antitrust treatment also
disappears.
Two responses are possible: (1) that the trucking firm contributes benefits
from integration that are not sufficient for the employment relationship, but that
are sufficient to justify preferential antitrust treatment; and (2) that the truck
drivers, if they wish to avail themselves of that preferential treatment, have the
same legal right to achieve this beneficial integration as the owner of the trucking
firm does. As to objection (1), it is not at all clear that this needle can be threaded.
Many trucking firms in fact contribute very little functional integration other than
bargaining customer contracts. To the extent they do more, they very likely are
misclassifying drivers as contractors. There is also no basis not to consider the
many other benefits that the truck drivers might claim for their economic
arrangement, not least of them the ability to earn a reasonable rate and stabilize
the market, which would tend to have effects upon operations as well. The binary
distinction between bargaining integration and productive integration is
moreover both false and self-fulfilling: if drivers were able to form a bargaining
unit, they very well might use the increased revenue to make upgrades and
investments, just as the firm would—perhaps even in a way that was integrated
across the group.
As to objection (2), simple incorporation will not protect the truck drivers.
An incorporated firm of truck drivers who own their own trucks—just as they do
in the independent contractor-based trucking firm—and who rotate bargaining
responsibilities with customers would not be immunized from Section 1 liability
the way that the trucking firm automatically is.45 A decision-maker is likely to
find that this arrangement is simply an incorporated cartel. In that event, the
drivers might not even have the opportunity to prove up benefits from
coordination, because the per se rule would likely apply. Yet if the same drivers
subordinate themselves to an owner and a manager, precisely the same price
coordination in precisely the same market is automatically immunized. This
43. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 108 (1978).
44. See, e.g., id. at 264 (“Both internal growth and horizontal merger eliminate rivalry, and they do
so more permanently than do cartel arrangements. Prices are fixed and markets allocated within firms.”).
45. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010).
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simple example makes the point stark, because it is very unlikely that a court
would ever look for more functional integration in the case where there is a
separate owner and a manager—even if they are not doing anything particularly
useful or socially productive. Thanks to the firm exemption, together with the per
se rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries, our system
paradoxically rewards an arrangement in which there is a boss to profit from the
drivers’ labor, while denying the individuals who perform the work the privilege
to coordinate prices.
III
THE CONTRACTION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS IN FISSURED ARRANGEMENTS
In each of the fissured business arrangements discussed above, the expansion
of coordination rights beyond the traditional boundaries of the firm exemption
for the more powerful actor is accompanied by a contraction of coordination
rights for the less powerful ones in its orbit. Antitrust denies to franchisees any
rights to engage in economic coordination, either as to their own price-setting or
as to their bargains with the powerful franchisor firms. Franchisors’ control over
franchisees is thus underwritten by not one but two antitrust rules: the allocation
of coordination rights to franchisors, and the denial of coordination rights to
franchisees. Uber and similar firms, meanwhile, insist that their drivers have no
right to coordinate under antitrust; and thus far, the law has denied them that
right. Indeed, Uber has argued that the per se rule bars drivers’ coordination and
that a local ordinance authorizing collective bargaining among drivers is
therefore subject to federal preemption by the Sherman Act.46 And independent
contractor truck drivers have been sued by trucking firms when they engaged in
concerted action to improve their positions; the law has also largely assumed that
they lack coordination rights.47
If franchisees were able to bring countervailing power to bear in their
bargains with franchisors, the result might not only be an ability to bargain more
meaningfully with their own employees,48 but also bargaining over joint
responsibility for those employment relationships themselves. Uber drivers who
formed a union and bargained their contracts with Uber might, building on these
connections, put themselves in a position to launch an app of their own.
Assuming it could pass muster under an unreformed firm exemption in the first
place,49 this possibility has little practical chance of coming organically into
fruition without, at a minimum, the initial integration created by a bargaining

46. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
47. Paul, supra note 1.
48. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, McDonald’s Franchisee Says the Company Just Told her “Just Pay Your
Employees Less,” WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/
2014/08/04/first-person-kathryn-slater-carter-the-franchise-owner-taking-on-mcdonalds/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.85a5d857adca [https://outline.com/UBtDhH].
49. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010). See also Paul,
supra note 2.
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agency or a union.50 This would be the case even putting aside the structural
disadvantages a driver-owned business would continue to face in competition
with the platforms, given the latter’s relationships to the financial markets.51
Similar possibilities attend organizing by independent contractor workers.
Fed Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n is the Court’s
strongest articulation of the rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm
boundaries, and it clearly articulates antitrust’s current preferred and disfavored
forms of coordination. In particular, the opinion shows that the antitrust norms
that the Court applied internalize deference to coordination within firms, singling
out coordination among individual or small service-providers’ coordination for
censure while ignoring other forms of coordination. Like the current antitrust
paradigm more generally, the Court selectively applied a putatively general norm
in favor of competition and against coordination. The Court also then extended
antitrust’s conventional allocation of coordination rights—privileging large,
powerful business firms as the primary mechanism of market coordination—into
the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts itself, relying upon that
particular antitrust logic in order to decide the boycotts that are and are not
protected by the First Amendment.
A. The Court’s Antitrust Analysis
Trial Lawyers applied the per se rule against horizontal price coordination
beyond firm boundaries to concerted action by individual service-providers and
micro-enterprises.52 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts and
conspiracies “in restraint of trade.”53 Judicial construction of Section 1 prohibits
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, and pronounces certain sorts of
agreements unreasonable per se. Once so categorized, such agreements need not,
indeed cannot, be re-examined for reasonability by future courts. Horizontal
price coordination beyond firm boundaries, otherwise known as price-fixing, is
currently considered per se unreasonable. Each of the decision-makers in the
Trial Lawyers case, from the ALJ to the Supreme Court, agreed that the lawyers’
boycott was a “classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.”54 Upon the finding of such coordination, a fact-finder is neither
required nor permitted to consider any other factors—for example, whether the

50. See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheesan & Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly
Strategy, PENN STATE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (making this point).
51. Uber and similar firms have relied massively on venture capital funding. A producers’
cooperative by its nature would not seek such funding—and would likely not be able to borrow on
favorable terms either, as a result. This in turn would affect its ability to compete with a firm like Uber,
which consistently loses money, apparently in service of a future operational pay-off (and in service of a
payoff in terms of share value once it goes public, in the meanwhile).
52. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
53. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
54. Id.
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resultant prices were reasonable or whether countervailing benefits flowed from
the coordination.55
The Court also noted that concerted reduction or stoppage in the sale of a
commodity, which the lawyers’ strike constituted, is similarly prohibited per se.56
More generally, concerted withholding of supply—of labor or services—is of
course the very essence of a labor strike, and relatedly is one of the few forms of
economic leverage available to those who own little or no capital.57 While
antitrust would thus condemn a labor strike absent the labor exemption, and does
condemn strikes beyond the bounds of the exemption, it is worth noting that the
antitrust notion of harm from “reduced output” fails to accurately capture the
mechanism by which a strike or boycott in fact works. According to current
conventional antitrust theory, reduced output is an antitrust harm in itself
(because it is by definition economically inefficient, which also usually means that
it automatically results in increased prices), not because it increases the
bargaining power of the seller to extract desired changes to the
contract/relationship in question (such as a higher price or wage).
But the latter, not the former, is how a strike or boycott actually works. Wages
are not increased following a strike because workers reduced their labor supply,
which automatically increased the price of labor. Instead, wages go up after a
successful strike because the business is economically harmed by the work
stoppage in specific ways, which in turn gives workers bargaining power to effect
desired changes to the contract. These two mechanisms—the real one, and the
theoretical one—are far apart. Strikes work because of specific business harms
that result from reduced operations. They are mediated through human volition
at the bargaining table, not through the supposedly impersonal workings of
market price.58
In applying the per se rule against the lawyers’ strike, the Court adopted the
antitrust vision in which markets are coordinated mainly through the mechanism
of the firm, while other forms of coordination are prohibited or disfavored.59 The
fact that the coordinating mechanism in this case is a public entity rather than a
putatively profit-maximizing business firm simply highlights the depth at which
these underlying assumptions are rooted, as further discussed below. To support
the centrality of the blanket prohibition upon horizontal coordination beyond
firm boundaries to the overall allocation of coordination rights under antitrust,
the Court approvingly quoted Robert Bork’s statement that permission to prove
55. Id. at 435. See also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
56. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423 (“This constriction of supply is the essence
of price-fixing, whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity
demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”) (quoting the Court of
Appeals).
57. Of course, this point is limited by the lack of protection for economic strikes under the NLRA.
Still, an economic strike is permitted under labor law, if not protected.
58. For an alternate view, see LEE supra note 37; NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF
MARKETS (2001).
59. Paul, supra note 2.
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lack of economic power in cases of horizontal price coordination would be
administratively unworkable, introducing complexities of market definition into
such cases.60
The Court also characterized the per se rule against horizontal price
coordination as something more fundamental, from a normative standpoint, than
a mere rule of administrative simplicity or convenience. In so doing, the Court
made a conceptual error. Analogizing horizontal price coordination to inherently
dangerous activities like stunt flying in congested areas, each instance of which
poses some threat to physical safety, it reasoned that each instance of price
coordination poses “some threat to the free market.”61 To support this assertion,
the Court again cited Bork, this time for the proposition that no one will engage
in price coordination unless it has the power to affect market prices.
The Court of Appeals had taken the position that the First Amendment ought
to protect the strike (as discussed in the next section) absent a showing that the
lawyers had market power. But the deeper problem is not that price coordination
is not anti-competitive—a basically question-begging term absent further
specification of the inevitable limits upon competition—or that the price
coordination of small actors will not affect market prices. In fact, the lawyers did
collectively have market power in the narrow sense: their coordination had the
ability to affect prices. As we can see from the record, absent intervention by the
competition authorities, it was poised to do just that. The problem is not that the
lawyers did not have an opportunity to prove a lack of market power, but that
market power, in the narrow sense recognized by the antitrust paradigm of Bork
and Trial Lawyers, is an insufficient criterion of permitting coordination.
The actual problem is that affecting prices always assumes a normative
baseline that the conventional antitrust paradigm leaves obscure but that is
fundamentally influenced by intra-firm coordination. Here that baseline was set
by the District’s own coordination of the market for legal services for indigent
criminal defendants. The Court described the normative base-line effectively in
temporal terms: the state of affairs “[p]rior to the boycott.”62 That description
holds constant everything other than the lawyers’ own coordination, as a matter
of the legally relevant possible worlds, when there is no good reason to do so. To
wit, the market might have been organized in any number of other ways: there
may have been, say, a few large law firms bargaining with the District, or there
may have been more than one buyer for the lawyers’ services. The particular
normative baseline adopted by the Court amounts to a preference for
determining prices through coordination that takes place within firm or
enterprise boundaries, while frowning upon effects upon prices by means of
coordination by smaller actors acting outside firm boundaries. This is a policy
choice about structuring markets in a particular way. Moving reality away from
that baseline, as the lawyers’ boycott almost did, does not pose an inherent
60. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 430–31.
61. Id. at 434.
62. Id. at 422.
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economic harm or threat, in the manner that, for example, stunt flying in
congested areas poses an inherent threat to physical safety. It simply moves
toward a different market order, and a different allocation of coordination rights.
In the market at issue, the Court assumed that the coordination that was
already occurring was an appropriate part of the normative baseline against
which any other scenario would be compared. The District, as the sole buyer of
legal services for indigent criminal defendants, directly coordinated the market
for those services, setting the hourly rates by legislation and coordinating the
market along various other dimensions as well. Yet the Court chose to entirely
disregard this coordination activity by the only buyer, while singling out the
economic coordination of the individual providers of legal services for censure.
Patterns of market coordination arise for all sorts of reasons,63 buyer power being
one species.64 In all of them, public power is present to some degree or other,
whether through background law or in some more active form. In short, there is
no good reason to privilege the pre-strike rates paid to the lawyers as the
normative or “competitive” ideal. Why, then, did the Court reach this
conclusion?
At the deepest level, the market order presupposed by the Court’s analytic
framework does not privilege competition as such; rather, it privileges firms, and
by extension enterprises, as the locus for the coordination of markets. The
Court’s opinion extends to the District the same immunity for intra-enterprise
economic coordination that it has long done for business entities. And it does so
because it assumes the District is acting as an ordinary firm, not because it
assumes it is acting as a government would. Indeed, the Court must assume the
District is acting as a firm, because otherwise the primary premise of its
argument—that the economically and socially appropriate rates must be set by
competition, which it further glosses as requiring policing from interference of
sellers’ collective action—would become incoherent.
Firms are primary in the consensus analytic framework generally adopted by
the courts for evaluating economic policy, and their halo sometimes extends to
governmental entities when those entities are seen to behave sufficiently like
business firms. This is evident in the various market participant doctrines that
pepper the landscape of American law, including antitrust law itself. Often,
governmental entities are permitted to engage in market coordination only if
they can show that they are market actors: i.e., that that they are sufficiently firmlike in that market.65 Assuming for the moment that it coherently delineates some
set of attributes, this sort of criterion of course privileges firm-based economic
coordination over, for example, direct public coordination of a market. While the

63. See LEE, supra note 37; FLIGSTEIN, supra note 58.
64. For one account of buyer power, see Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How
Buyer-Supplier Relations Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 213, 213 2018.
65. Market participant exception to federal preemption under the FAAAA; market actor
exemption to federal preemption in case of federal deregulation legislation; market participant exception
to the dormant commerce clause doctrine.
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Court was not expressly evaluating the applicability of a market participant
exception in Trial Lawyers, it effectively assumed that the District was acting as
a firm would, and that therefore the lawyers’ rates ought to be set by competition.
The court could have assumed that the District was acting in a public capacity by
coordinating a market or engaging in economic policy-making, and that that
policy should be given deference for that reason. However, the Court gave carte
blanche to the District’s coordination while censuring individual sellers’ based on
an assumption that the District was acting as a firm would. Again, to say
otherwise would contradict the Court’s repeated invocation of competitive rates.
B. Extending Antitrust’s Allocation of Coordination Rights to the First
Amendment
The Court then incorporated its preferred allocation of economic
coordination rights, determined under antitrust, into its construction of the First
Amendment law of expressive boycotts. The Court was principally concerned
with the applicability of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,66 which also involved a
boycott. The Court’s rejection of the application of Claiborne Hardware to the
lawyers’ boycott revolved around the fundamental distinction it drew between
the aims of the two boycotts: “special” advantage in the market (sought by the
lawyers’ boycott), and “equality and freedom” that the Court agreed were
“preconditions of the free market” (sought by the Claiborne Hardware
boycott).67 Many have queried and pointed out the problem with putting “labor
subordination” in a different constitutional category than “racial
subordination.”68 Additionally, the characterization of the lawyers’ boycott as
special market advantage—in contrast to a precondition of the free market—
relies upon the particular allocation of coordination rights that antitrust has
chosen to espouse. As discussed in the preceding section, collective action among
the lawyers would be no more a “special” market advantage than other forms of
coordination that the Court permits.
Thus, the purpose of the boycott was also defined as a private advantage from
the outset.69 This is in contrast to the Court’s placement of consumer welfare in
its normative framework as, effectively, a public value. But after all, consumer
benefit is also simply a benefit to a particular set of actors in the market, yet the
Court emphasized only the absence of public value in benefits to producers.70
Whether one considers the situation specifically in terms of labor subordination
66. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 558 (1982).
67. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 426. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. 558 (1982).
68. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of The First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2088 (2018); see also Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust
Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. UNIV. CHIC. L. J. 969 (2016).
69. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 427 (focusing on the fact that the objective of
the boycott was to create an economic benefit to the lawyers, the sellers/producers in this market, to
distinguish it from the public purposes implicated by Claiborne Hardware).
70. Id. at 424.
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or not, it is plausible to consider a producer-oriented norm like making a
reasonable living, fair competition, or fair rates as a public value to be considered
along with others, including consumer welfare.71 However one ultimately decides
to value these considerations, the evaluation should not begin by placing one
consideration in the category of public value and the other in the category of
private value. In this and other ways, the Trial Lawyers opinion epitomizes the
antitrust reasoning that dominates today, so far as ordering producers’ and
workers’ interests are concerned.
Importantly, this ordering is a judgment the Court imported into its
construction of the First Amendment. Both the majority and the dissent in Trial
Lawyers limited the First Amendment’s reach in the case of boycotts to the
political rather than the economic, while reaching different conclusions regarding
which side the lawyers’ boycott fell on.72 The majority’s application of this
distinction relied upon reading Chicago School antitrust’s allocation of
coordination rights into the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts, in that
an unprotected economic boycott was defined in terms of “special” market
advantage. In other words, the Court held that economic boycotts for reasonable
rates by service-providers or small producers were unprotected by the First
Amendment specifically because they seek “special advantage,” a concept that
requires the normative framework of Chicago School antitrust and the firm
exemption.73 Special market advantage is defined by a normative benchmark
constituted by antitrust’s preferred and disfavored coordination mechanisms
(firm-based and horizontal, respectively). The holding thus incorporates the
conventional antitrust understanding that coordination outside business firms is
special and usually disfavored—but it is now also a holding about what the First
Amendment protects, not only about what is not permitted under antitrust. Thus,
Trial Lawyers, the purest expression of the Court’s rule against horizontal
coordination beyond firm boundaries, is itself an object lesson in the firm
exemption, and it also extends this allocation of coordination rights to the First
Amendment.74
71. Indeed, such an idea of fairness, including the idea of fair price, has its own antitrust tradition,
even if it has been largely submerged.
72. Id. at 428 (“Only after recognizing the well-settled validity of prohibitions against various
economic boycotts did we conclude in Claiborne Hardware that ‘peaceful, political activity such as that
found in the [Mississippi] boycott’ are entitled to constitutional protection.”) The dissent, while reaching
a different conclusion, largely accepted this framework as well. Id. at 437 (referring to the lawyers’ action
as an “expressive political boycott”); Id. at 446 (“the facts at the very least do not exclude the possibility
that the SCTLA succeeded due to political rather than economic power.”).
73. Id. at 426.
74. The Court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ holding, applying O’Brien, that antitrust rules be
applied “prudently and with sensitivity” to First Amendment interests. The Court of Appeals had held
that in the context of an expressive boycott such as the lawyers’ action, this requirement entailed express
consideration of market power and barred application of the per se rule. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 233-34 (D.C. Cir.). The Court rejected this approach, holding that the
integrity of the per se rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries was a more important
thing to protect than the expressive content of the boycott. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S.
at 430. In this instance, the Court essentially abrogated First Amendment interests in favor of (its
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IV
TOWARD A RE-ALLOCATION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS
Contemporary fissured business arrangements distill the preference for topdown, hierarchical control of smaller players by more powerful firms that is
already present in today’s antitrust framework, while often pushing beyond the
boundaries set by the current expression of that framework in the surface
structure of the law. They call out for a re-allocation of coordination rights under
antitrust law. What criteria are available to effect this re-allocation, and on what
basis should it be achieved?
Our current framework recognizes one other relevant source of coordination
rights, beyond the firm, and that of course is based in labor law. The labor
exemption to antitrust essentially permits economic coordination that antitrust
would otherwise condemn where individuals engaged in the performance of labor
or services are sufficiently subject to the power and control of a firm, and lack
significant power and control—including relevant ownership rights—of their
own.75 From this perspective, the labor exemption has always—or at least, long—
been a limited qualification of the firm exemption, and it has been in a basic way
dependent upon it. The limited qualification represented by the labor exemption
is underlined by the fact that the collective power of labor—even if it were fully
realized—cannot legally be brought to bear to contest basic firm or capital
decisions, an outcome that Karl Klare and others have shown was not intrinsic to
the Wagner Act itself, but was instead imposed by a contingent turn in the
decisional law.76 Given this basic derivative relationship of the labor exemption
to the firm exemption, it is then no wonder that the superficial undoing of the
firm has further undone the labor exemption.
How might we conceive of a new allocation of economic coordination rights
that would avoid some of these problems, which have undermined the New Deal
order almost beyond recognition? Attempts to broaden the labor exemption or
to create new worker exemptions while retaining or copying its basic structure
are unlikely to be sufficient. Fissured business structures show that the firm,
which was never a platonic ideal to start with, will continue to change and
mutate—partly of course in response to the law’s own allocation of coordination
rights. Imagine if all workers or individual service-providers currently classified
as independent contractors gained coordination rights. What would stop many
firms who currently use independent contractors from moving to a system of
contracting with, say, two to three person “firms” of workers—firms that are
conveniently incorporated by signing ready-made forms in the company’s office
upon hiring? These groups of workers would of course lack coordination rights
in their bargaining with the firm that retains their services, and their intra-firm
interpretation of) antitrust, rather than overtly rewriting the First Amendment in the image of Chicago
School’s antitrust allocation of coordination rights.
75. This is true whether “independent contractors” are covered by the labor exemption or not.
76. Karl Klare, The Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
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coordination rights would be negligible. The law should not allocate coordination
rights to working people on the condition of particular business structuring
decisions made by others. But such decisions are the inevitable response to smallbore redefinitions of the labor exemption, as fissuring itself teaches us.
Instead, we might consider allocating coordination rights on the basis of
power and social benefit. Importantly, to guide the application of these concepts,
we must first discard the ideal-state competitive order as the default normative
framework for antitrust and for economic regulation more generally. This is not
to say that competition as a social process, referring to healthy business rivalry, is
not important to antitrust law: it is, and ought to be balanced with appropriate
and socially beneficial coordination. However, once we realize that the idealstate concept of competition that is currently presumed to form the basis for
antitrust law is contributing very little—except as a smokescreen for other
normative choices—then we need no longer view economic coordination as a
special exception to the order of things. Thus, we need not look for conditions of
deprivation, or powerlessness, as constituting the sole basis—aside from the firm
exemption—for the appropriate exercise of coordination rights because they are
an exception to an otherwise perfect order. That is what our current framework
does, and it is also the assumption on which even the most ambitious reform
proposals proceed.77
Instead, once coordination is no longer a special exception to the ideal-state
competitive order, we may think of allocating coordination rights not only in
order to contest existing power over someone—in other words, to contest
conditions of domination—but more broadly and positively, to allocate
coordination rights in order to confer a social benefit and so long as the
coordination does not result in power over someone else. In this vision, power
would be a constraint upon coordination rather than the criterion of its
permission. So, truck drivers would be able to engage in direct price coordination
among each other, so long as that coordination did not result in the undue
exercise of power over some other group of people: other truck drivers or
customers, for example.78 They would not have to show that someone else has
power over them—whether through prices, or something else—in order to
engage in coordination. Indeed, within such a framework, each of the groups
discussed in Part II—franchisees, Uber drivers, and independent contractors—
would quite plainly be allocated coordination rights. The precise scope of those
rights should be determined in order to ensure that undue power over other
groups does not result. Moreover, the availability of those rights would largely
not depend upon unilateral decisions made by the lead firms in any of these
arrangements in defining their relationships with workers, franchisees, or others

77. See Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest: Getting
Back to Basics, in VOICES AT WORK (Tonia Novitz & Alan Bogg, eds. 2014).
78. Such determinations ought to be informed by empirical study of the particular market or sector
in which the coordination takes place, including any relevant power dynamics and including the effects
of the coordination in question upon workers, consumers, and the broader community.
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in their orbit. Thus, small players’ coordination rights would be more secure than
those allocated by a broadened labor exemption or other new exemption.
Conversely, on this alternative approach to the allocation of coordination
rights, antitrust law would not permit powerful firms like Uber and McDonald’s
to exert control over small, less-powerful players like drivers and franchisees.
However, rather than prohibiting this coordination on the ground that it
facilitates horizontal coordination that is presumptively bad, antitrust law ought
to take the view that it is impermissible because it unduly exacerbates power
imbalances and domination, and confers no social benefit that would not be
better realized through more democratic forms of coordination.
In both directions, a conscious re-allocation of coordination rights would
work toward balancing undue asymmetries of power rather than exacerbating
them, as the current antitrust framework does, particularly in the context of
fissured business arrangements. In order to do so, it would also recognize that the
current framework makes normative choices about allocating coordination rights
that cannot be derived from putatively neutral principles supplied by the
competitive ideal.

